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ironic that the business community, once economic decen- 
tralization and marketization gave it significant structural 
autonomy from the state, systematically went about reestab- 
lishing informal ties to the state by cultivating relationships 
with officials. Pearson finds the roots of the hybrid pattern of 
socialist corporatism combined with clientelism in Confucian 
thought, in the history of merchant-state relations, in pre- 
revolutionary China, and in socialist China, but she never 
uses the term "political culture" to describe the source of this 
continuity between pre- and post-1949 China. She implicitly 
recognizes, but never states, that China's political culture has 
survived the demise of the imperial state, as well as the 
collapse of republican and socialist institutional forms, such 
as a centrally directed economy. China's traditional political 
culture is a key to understanding why the business community 
persists in its old habits of relating to the state instead of 
attempting to create a civil society. In short, Pearson could 
well have concluded that culture has as much, it not far more, 
to do with the pattern of society-state relations than does 
socialism. 
Pearson may be correct that if the well-positioned new 
business elite does not bring about radical political reform, 
then no other economic group is likely to do so. But the 
entrepreneurial managers of town and village enterprises 
(TVEs), whom she dismisses as too conservative and not well 
positioned to force political reform, should not be over- 
looked; in local elections, the party is most likely to nominate, 
and villagers are most likely to elect, candidates who have 
successfully established or managed TVEs. Those who are 
elected gain greater power to challenge the basic society-state 
relationship, but this group is likewise bound by political 
culture to work with the state, not against it. 
Pearson examines the state-created business associations, 
which represent the new elite but are dominated by retired 
officials, as part of the state's effort to coopt potentially 
autonomous social forces. Here, again, she notes that this is 
not a one-way relationship. Business benefits from the link- 
ages of these officials to government bureaucracies because 
they give members access to "the vertical, informal clien- 
telism embedded in these associations" (p. 135). 
Pearson makes an important contribution to our under- 
standing of the relationship between political culture and the 
development of civil society. Elements that in another cul- 
tural context might lead to the creation of a civil society tend 
to be quickly absorbed in China into a culturally rooted 
clientelism and socialist corporatism. As a result, the state's 
corporatist strategy is to encourage business to support 
economic development while restricting its political role. At 
the same time, the business elite has been allowed consider- 
able financial success for its cooperation. 
Pearson concludes by putting China into the East Asian 
context. Once she asserts that clientelism in China is far less 
functional for the purposes of development than elsewhere in 
East Asia, she is left with the difficult question of explaining 
China's ability to produce growth comparable to such East 
Asian states as Japan and Korea. It is beyond the scope of her 
book to address this question fully, but her partial conclusion 
may tell us much about the success of the "Chinese model." 
In her estimation, local officials in China may have acted as 
"corporate directors" for their localities, and the central state 
may not have interfered with "neophyte business entities in 
business, agriculture, or local government" (p. 158) as much 
as one might assume. In short, beneath a cloak of commu- 
nism there beats a capitalist heart in many local Chinese 
officials, who have encouraged economic growth within the 
hybrid form of clientelism and socialist corporatism. 
Pearson's book adds an important dimension to our un- 
derstanding of how China's communist regime has been able 
to maintain broadly based support as it liberalizes the econ- 
omy. Deeply entrenched cultural attitudes and practices 
predispose the new business elite to cooperate with the 
regime in a clientelistic pattern, a predisposition that is 
reinforced by socialist corporatism. It will take far more than 
the disappearance of communism or the creation of a mul- 
tiparty system to eliminate this mutually beneficial hybrid 
pattern. 
Islamic Political Culture, Democracy, and Human Rights. By 
Daniel E. Price. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999. 221p. 
$59.95. 
Shahrough Akhavi, University of South Carolina 
Does "Islam" cause authoritarianism? Samuel Huntington 
claims it is antidemocratic (The Clash of Civilizations, 1996). 
Daniel Price begs to differ and concludes that it neither 
undermines nor supports democracy and/or human rights. 
Actually, it was Ann Mayer who in 1991 argued that Islamic 
values can be marshaled on behalf of human rights schemes 
but that male Muslims have interpreted these values in a way 
adverse to such rights (Islam and Human Rights, 3d ed., 
1999). 
Price, who ignores Mayer-although he lists the first 
edition in his bibliography-uses a simple typology, following 
William Shepard ("Islam and Ideology," International Journal 
of Middle East Studies 19 [August 1987]: 307-36). The key 
concepts are "comprehensiveness," the degree to which the 
shari'ah (Islamic law) is applied, and "authenticity," the 
extent to which non-Islamic values are permitted to influence 
society. Operationalization of comprehensiveness is based on 
whether Islamic law "is used" (p. 145) in the following 
domains: (1) personal status; (2) economics; (3) social cus- 
toms; (4) crime and punishment; and (5) governance. If 
shari'ah is not applied, then Price assigns a zero. If it is 
applied exclusively, then he assigns a three. Between these 
extremes are cases of modest and major use, which merit a 
two and three, respectively. 
By contrast, the scale for authenticity ranges from 0-15: 
0-2 represents a society in which non-Islamic ideas, institu- 
tions, and technologies [sic] are accepted without reference 
to Islam; 3-5 means they are accepted by rationalizing their 
compatibility with Islam; 6-8 is a society in which they are 
accepted but believed enhanced by Islamic ones; 9-11 means 
they are accepted, but Muslims make efforts to "trace their 
roots in Islam" (p. 146); 12-15 means they are rejected. 
Leaving aside the asymmetry of the 12-15 category (the 
ordinal range is four as opposed to three in the other four 
categories), there is no clarification of the difference between 
rationalizing the compatibility of non-Islamic ideas and insti- 
tutions, on the one hand, and trackingg] their roots in Islam," 
even though these two categories are on opposite sides of the 
intermediate position on Price's spectrum. 
Price is aware of the difficulties encountered in assigning 
numerical scores to societies' performance on these dimen- 
sions, which in the final analysis are based on "guesstimates." 
Turkey gets a one on authenticity, and Senegal gets a "three 
or four" (p. 146). The decision as to what score to accord a 
society comes down to interpreting the evidence contained in 
leaders' statements and speeches; scholarship on the political 
systems involved; constitutions; media reports; information 
generated from these states' embassies in the United States; 
the author's personal contacts in these states; and survey 
questionnaire responses by members of the Middle East 
Studies Association of North America. Price then seeks to 
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collate and distill the data generated by all these sources into 
quantitative integers, which is a daunting task at the least. 
Four descriptive chapters discuss Egypt and Jordan, Syria 
and Tunisia, Saudi Arabia and Morocco, and Algeria and 
Iran. Another fifteen Muslim states are included in the 
statistical analysis. The relationship between Islam and de- 
mocracy is mediated by seven variables, four of which, 
because difficult to quantify, are excluded from the regression 
analysis. These four are historical influences, regime 
strength, regime strategy, and the strength and orientation of 
Islamic groups. The remaining three are quantifiable: mod- 
ernization, presence of social cleavages in society, and the 
presence of a minority religious group. Among Price's hy- 
potheses are: (1) an inverse correlation exists between the 
presence of politicized cleavages and democracy; (2) there is 
an inverse correlation between the existence of a minority 
religious group and democracy; (3) a curvilinear relationship 
exists between the degree of a society's "wealthiness" and 
democracy (beyond a certain threshold of wealth, the rela- 
tionship becomes inverse); (4) the more rapid the economic 
change occurring in a society, the less democratic it will be; 
and (5) a positive relationship exists between the level of 
social mobility in a society and democracy. 
After his statistical runs, Price concludes: "I have provided 
evidence in support of the argument that Islam is not a 
monolithic political force that is the primary cause of political 
outcomes in predominantly Muslim countries" (p. 177). 
When control variables are placed into the mix, the relation- 
ship between Islamic political culture and authoritarianism 
becomes insignificant. 
To all this one can only say "amen." Should we be 
surprised? After all, a moment's reflection will reveal diver- 
sity in the social, economic, and political processes and 
institutions of contemporary Muslim states. Because of these 
variations, one may not logically use the constant of "Islam" 
to explain authoritarianism in these systems. If "Islam" were 
the culprit, then the polities of these systems would be 
characterized by uniformity. Price is to be commended for 
the industry he brought to the task of making sense of Islamic 
political culture, but such labors appear to have yielded a 
finding that is predictable on theoretical grounds. 
The book contains a number of errors in grammar, syntax, 
orthography, and occasionally even substance. An example of 
this last is the statement that Islamic law "was finalized over 
eight hundred years ago and has not been significantly altered 
since" (p. 24). In fact, the shari'ah continues to evolve, in part 
because one of its sources is the opinion of jurists. In earlier 
periods, the juristic principle of maslahah mursalah (public 
interest) was scarcely known, but in the last two centuries it 
has been elaborated in a way as to be undoubtedly unrecog- 
nizeable by earlier jurists, including the Caliph 'Umar ibn 
al-Khattab (d. 644) or Malik ibn Anas (d. 795), al-Juwayni (d. 
1085), al-Ghazali (d. 1111), or Najm al-Din al-Tawfi (d. 1316). 
Other mistakes include Price's assertion that the Prophet 
Muhammad's second wife was a merchant (p. 25). Populace 
is rendered "populous" (pp. 27, 30). The transliteration of 
the word for a Christian or Jew (protected people in Islam) is 
given incorrectly as dhimmini (it should be dhimmi); we get 
the expression "quranicaly justified" (as opposed to 
Qur'anically justified); and the two early dynasties in Islam 
are spelled Abasaid and Ummayid (the correct forms are 
'Abbasid and-Umayyad). (All these mistakes occur on p. 28, 
and dhimmini is repeated on p. 148.) In comparing Islam in 
Morocco and Algeria, Price tells us that "political Islam has 
taken a much less virulent form in Algeria," but surely he 
means in Morocco (p. 34). 
In the bibliography Price errs in claiming 1986 to be the 
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date for Shepard's article (it is 1987); reverses the dates of 
publication of the two works by Piscatori; misattributes 
Vatin's essay on puritanism and reform in Algerian Islam to 
Piscatori's 1986 work, Islam in a World of Nation States 
(Vatin's essay appeared in Piscatori's 1983 edited volume, 
Islam in the Political Process); and misspells a variety of 
author names and terms: "Phanatos" (correct: Thanatos), 
"Ahkavi" (it is Akhavi), "Mahkzen" (it is Makhzen), "Mat- 
tadeh" (it is Mottahedeh), "Tahari" (it is Taheri), "Tibbi" (it 
is Tibi), and so on. 
Popular Movements and State Formation in Revolutionary 
Mexico: The Agraristas and Cristeros of Michoacan. By 
Jennie Purnell. Durham, NC, and London: Duke Univer- 
sity Press, 1999. 271p. $49.95 cloth, $17.95 paper. 
Neil Harvey, New Mexico State University 
Jennie Purnell's detailed historical analysis of rural conflict in 
Mexico in the 1920s sheds new light on the formation of 
political identities in the context of revolutionary state for- 
mation. The book is well written and provides new material 
on the comparatively understudied cristero rebellion of 
1926-29. Drawing on the experience of three regions of 
Michoacain state in Mexico's center-west, Purnell traces 
divergent responses to two main elements of postrevolution- 
ary politics: radical agrarianism and anticlericalism. The 
author's concern with local histories is prompted by her 
dissatisfaction with structuralist analyses that tend to assume 
fixed interests and identities of social agents due to their 
economic position. Purnell also rejects new social movements 
theory as an inadequate framework for analysis. In explaining 
why some peasants supported the goals of agrarian reform 
and anticlericalism while others took up arms against such 
policies, Purnell focuses on how historical legacies of local 
conflict were politicized in new ways during the 1920s as the 
postrevolutionary elites sought to consolidate national gov- 
ernment and reshape cultural identities. 
For Purnell, the contours of state power emerged from 
myriad local and regional histories of negotiation, accommo- 
dation, and resistance. In this respect, Purnell clearly locates 
her work within the recent literature in Mexican studies on 
everyday forms of state formation (the title of a 1994 volume 
edited by Gil Joseph and Daniel Nugent, which include 
essays by James Scott and Derek Sayer). In this sense, Purnell 
takes aim against both orthodox and revisionist understand- 
ings of revolutionary state formation in Mexico. The former 
tend to view the state as representing the popular will, and 
the latter claim that the new state was able simply to impose 
its centralized authority on a passive society. For Purnell, 
state power is not seen in terms of the successful centraliza- 
tion of authority in the capital city (expressed by the notion of 
"Leviathan on the Zocalo"). Instead, it is the contingent 
result of conflictive processes of resistance and negotiation 
that take place in a great variety of local and regional 
contexts, where what is at stake is not national power but 
local understandings of political authority, religious practices, 
and property relations. 
The book is divided into eight chapters. The first lays out 
Purnell's argument in favor of the nuances of local histories, 
promising a very descriptive but also analytically perceptive 
text. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 provide relevant historical contex- 
tualization of local resistance to nineteenth-century liberal- 
ism and (early) twentieth-century state formation. In this 
way, Purnell connects longer term processes of identity 
formation with the cristero rebellion. Her original, empirical 
research, carried out as part of a doctoral dissertation, is 
